Probable Belief and Induction : Ramsey's two steps out of the Humean predicament

Recent trends in philosophical discussions of probability and decision-making under uncertainty at least partly originate in Frank P. Ramsey's theory of 'partial belief' or subjective probability. In contrast to vibrant controversies over the further development or sophistication of Ramseyan framework, however, little has been discussed in terms of how his arguments would relate to the 'old problem of induction' allegedly once posed by Hume. To make it clear is the purpose of this article. Considering several arguments in his 1926 paper 'Truth and Probability, ' I will reconstruct Ramsey's theory of probable belief from the point of view that how it could enable him to escape from the so-called Humean predicament regarding induction. In consequence of that, the followings will be pinpointed. First, Ramsey rejects the assumption that we can perceive the degree of belief that arises in our mind, which in turn leads him to establish a 'purely psychological method' or operational way of 'measuring belief'. Though this was done through a criticism toward Keynes' theory of probability, the presupposition denied by Ramsey is precisely the one which Hume made, and was apparently having some trouble with, when setting up his theory of belief in Treatise. Second, Ramsey sees as decisive the Humean argument against the principle of induction. According to him, however, it is nonetheless reasonable for us to adopt induction precisely because it is a useful habit, and the business of philosophy at this end is to investigate and analyse, by inductive reasoning, the nature of induction. This is circular but not vicious at all, Ramsey contends. His own defense of this position is not flawless, and indeed I will show how it is that Hume would not accept Ramsey's defense, which would account for the dismal note of Hume's prospect for the fruitfulness of philosophical inquiry