Some Problems of Value Theory

The article by Professor Findlay is a Japanese translation of a résumé in English of five lectures given at Kyoto University in September, 1964. The résumé was written by Professor Findlay and distributed to the audience. We may quote here its first and second paragraphs to show what it is about. "The aim of the lectures is to consider what procedures and claims are involved in the enterprise of constructing a comprehensive map of values and disvalues that can be regarded as having some sort of intersubjective validity or cogency, and also, secondly, to go some way in constructing such a map, in actually expounding an axiology or system of intersubjective values. Its aim may therefore be said to be both axiological and meta-axiological (or reflective upon axiology). It works on the assumption that these two enterprises (developing an axiology and investigating its foundations) are inseparable. In this respect the lectures are not representative of contemporary British thought, which treats ethics from a resolutely meta-ethical point of view, and which considers that the nature of ethical discourse, or of valuediscourse in general, can be analysed without considering the specific filling that is given to it or the concrete judgements in which it issues. On the prevailing British (and also American) view, ethical discourse is a kind of discourse in which we try to impose certain emotional or practical attitudes on everyone, ourselves included-- 'I like this, do so also' --what particular objects or contents we prescribe for such attitudes is a matter for the individual or for the society to decide. Such decisions will differ from one man or society to another, and are not matters for the philosopher to investigate. Thus the whole question of the norms of right conduct or the ends of living ceases to be a philosophical issue, and becomes a matter exclusively for preachers, politicians etc. to pronounce upon. As opposed to this view the position of the lectures is that the very nature of value-discourse and the typical procedures it follows are such as to entail the validity of certain very fundamental value-judgements and to invalidate others: we cannot, in other words, enter deeply into the outward pattern of our value-judgements without also becoming commited as to their matter. Value-discourse, in short, presupposes a highly general pattern of values, from which, as from a mustardseed, all significant impersonal valuations can be shown to spring. The question as to how there can be any such thing as impersonal validity or invalidity in the basically affective, personal sphere of values is of course profoundly difficult, but we must not reject the possibility of such validity or invalidity merely because its existence raises problems. (cf. Kant: 'How is pure mathematics possible?') The enterprise of constructing ordered maps of value has led to much disagreement, but also to developing agreement on many points: it is a nebulous and inexact, but by no means wholly nebulous and inexact inquiry, and not less important because it is nebulous. Many disagreements regarding values are, moreover, due to logical mistakes, e.g. the belief that values cannot lie in opposed directions and be practically incompatible, the belief that values fall into a single dimension etc.. Once these logical errors have been cleared up, much greater agreement may be achievable. Our aim is to evaluate and criticize the whole enterprise of value-mapping, and in the light of such criticism and evaluation to develop it in a more satisfactory manner.