Strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium in large finite-player games when the action set is a manifold

We present results on the relationship between non-atomic games (in dis-tributional form) and approximating games with a large but finite number of players. Specifically, in a setting with differentiable payoff functions, we show that: (1) The set of all non-atomic games has an open dense subset such that any finite-player game that is sufficiently close (in terms of distributions of players' characteristics) to a game in this subset and has sufficiently many players has a strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium (Theorem 1), and (2) any equilibrium distribution of any non-atomic game is the limit of equilibrium distributions defined from strict pure strategy Nash equilibria of finite-player games (Theorem 2). This supplements our paper Carmona and Podczeck (2020b) " Strict Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Finite-Player Games " [Theoretical Economics , forthcoming], where analogous results are established for the case where the action set of players is a subset of some Euclidean space, with non-empty interior , and payoff functions are such that equilibrium actions are in the interior of the action set. The goal of the present paper is to remove these assumptions