Debunking what?

In this chapter, I approach the topic of debunking arguments in ethics by focusing on two thoughts. The first thought is that while norms of truth and desirability often go together, that is not always the case. The second thought is that no one likes to be made a fool of. This chapter describes how these two thoughts, when suitably combined, help to explain both the interest of debunking arguments in ethics, and also the widely shared response that such arguments will tend to be at best partly or locally successful. Book synopsis: Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in evolutionary debunking arguments directed against certain types of belief, particularly moral and religious beliefs. According to those arguments, the evolutionary origins of the cognitive mechanisms that produce the targeted beliefs render these beliefs epistemically unjustified. The reason is that natural selection cares for reproduction and survival rather than truth, and false beliefs can in principle be as evolutionarily advantageous as true beliefs. The present volume brings together fourteen essays that examine evolutionary debunking arguments not only in ethics and philosophy of religion, but also in philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, and epistemology. The essays move forward research on those arguments by shedding fresh light on old problems and proposing new lines of inquiry. The book will appeal to scholars and graduate students interested in the possible skeptical implications of evolutionary theory in any of the above domains