A Defense of Moral Realism

My Theis is a defense of the moral metaethical theory known as moral realism. Moral realism is the idea that moral laws are objective, true, non-natural, and applicable to all moral agents. I reference and subscribe to the form of moral relativism that is proposed by Russ Shafer-Landau in his book Moral Realism. In my thesis I argue that moral realism is the correct view of moral laws, and that relativism, error theory, and noncognitivism are all incorrect views. Relativism argues that moral laws stem from the culture and people in each society, and that they are subjective to only those individuals. Error theory argues that moral laws are not real, but we, as moral agents, acts as if they are. Moral laws are thus seen as objective, even though they are not real. Noncognitivism argues that moral laws are not real, and we do not even act as if they are. Moral language has no meaning to it, and it is really us just proclaiming our desires to those around us. My goal in this paper is to show that moral realism has more strength as a moral theory and that the other three have more weaknesses, thus leading one to conclude that moral realism is the correct view of morality