The Explanationist Argument For Moral Realism

In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good expla-nations. My criticism is different. I will argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysi-cal claims of realism do not follow. I The Explanationist Argument According to moral realists, moral properties such as justice and good-ness take their own unique place in nature’s ontological roll-call. Although realists disagree about the nature of these moral properties — for example, whether they are reducible or otherwise constituted by non-moral or natural properties — they all agree that such properties are genuine constituents of the world that are sometimes instantiate