We participate in the lasting debate about the persistence of monopolies under technological change, by examining two deterministic games modelling innovation auctions. We highlight some novel aspects within such debate. If product innovation is at stake, the joint effect of diseconomies of scope and product differentiation may allow the entrant to acquire the innovation and give rise to a duopoly. Process innovation is analysed in a model with increasing marginal production costs to show that the innovating monopolist always uses both technologies by virtue of Jensen’s inequality, and this is sufficient but not necessary to preserve its monopoly power
The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market a...
In this paper we reconsider the well known Schumpeterian hypotesis stating the superiority of monopo...
In the spirit of Arrow (The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton, NJ, Princeton Unive...
We participate in the lasting debate about the persistence of monopolies under technological change...
The issue of the persistence of monopoly when at least one labour-managed firm takes part in an auct...
A new rationale for the persistence of monopolies is based on a precommitment of the incumbent monop...
Arrow (1962) showed that a secure monopolist (unconcerned with preemption) has a weaker incentive th...
In a recent paper published in this Review, Gilbert and Newbery (1982) show that, because an incumbe...
The theoretical literature on technological competition has been mostly concerned with various aspec...
Arrow (1962) showed that a secure monopolist (unconcerned with preemption) has a weaker incentive th...
Using a simple linear demand and marginal cost function, we demonstrate that both competition and mo...
Can a monopoly persist by expanding its operation to a new market after strategically bidding for an...
We construct a competitive model of innovation and growth under constant returns to scale. Previous ...
The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market a...
This paper focuses on innovation for new product with exogenously determined horizontal difference f...
The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market a...
In this paper we reconsider the well known Schumpeterian hypotesis stating the superiority of monopo...
In the spirit of Arrow (The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton, NJ, Princeton Unive...
We participate in the lasting debate about the persistence of monopolies under technological change...
The issue of the persistence of monopoly when at least one labour-managed firm takes part in an auct...
A new rationale for the persistence of monopolies is based on a precommitment of the incumbent monop...
Arrow (1962) showed that a secure monopolist (unconcerned with preemption) has a weaker incentive th...
In a recent paper published in this Review, Gilbert and Newbery (1982) show that, because an incumbe...
The theoretical literature on technological competition has been mostly concerned with various aspec...
Arrow (1962) showed that a secure monopolist (unconcerned with preemption) has a weaker incentive th...
Using a simple linear demand and marginal cost function, we demonstrate that both competition and mo...
Can a monopoly persist by expanding its operation to a new market after strategically bidding for an...
We construct a competitive model of innovation and growth under constant returns to scale. Previous ...
The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market a...
This paper focuses on innovation for new product with exogenously determined horizontal difference f...
The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market a...
In this paper we reconsider the well known Schumpeterian hypotesis stating the superiority of monopo...
In the spirit of Arrow (The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton, NJ, Princeton Unive...