Principle of judicial independence in the context of the evolution of EU law

Straipsnyje, atsižvelgus į Teisingumo Teismo formuojamą jurisprudenciją, atskleidžiami teismų nepriklausomumo principo turinys, reikšmė ir jo raida Europos Sąjungos teisės kontekste. Analizuojami teismų nepriklausomumą nusakantys kriterijai, išvystyti remiantis Sutarties dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo (SESV) 267 straipsniu, valstybės narėms taikoma pareiga užtikrinti veiksmingą teisminę apsaugą, kylanti iš Europos Sąjungos sutarties (ESS) 19 straipsnio 1 dalies antrosios pastraipos, ir aptariamas šių nuostatų ryšys. Straipsnyje atskleidžiama, kad pastarųjų metų ESTT pateikti išaiškinimai, viena vertus, yra reikšmingi apibrėžiant valstybių narių diskreciją ir jos ribas reglamentuojant nacionalinių teismų sistemų veikimą. Galima teigti, kad šios laisvės ribos siejamos su valstybių narių pareiga veiksmingai užtikrinti teismų nepriklausomumą kaip jis apskritai suprantamas Sąjungos teisėje. Antra vertus, Teisingumo Teismo šioje srityje plėtojama jurisprudencija taip pat konsolidavo bei toliau apibrėžė SESV 267 straipsnio ir ESS 19 straipsnio 1 dalies taikymo pagrindus bei įvardijo šių nuostatų sąveikos elementus. Funkciniu požiūriu SESV 267 straipsnis, ESS 19 straipsnio 1 dalis vertinami kaip savarankiški, nedarantys įtakos vienas kito taikymo apimčiai ir pagrindams. Tačiau šių nuostatų taikymo kontekste suformuotas teismų nepriklausomumo principo turinio apibrėžimas koreliuoja, jis yra universalus.The article examines, in light of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the significance and the content of the principle of judicial independence in the context of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and second subparagraph of Article 19 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It reveals that historically the criteria defining judicial independence were developed in the context of a preliminary rulings procedure taking into account its specific functions. The objectives of this procedure have predetermined an extensive definition of a notion of “court” covering not only courts stricto sensu as understood from the point of view of national law, but other national institutions as well. Still, such jurisprudence of the Court of Justice developing Article 267 TFEU may not be understood as seeking to evaluate to what extent national law is compatible with material imperatives stemming from EU law, but only serves a procedural purpose allowing an evaluation of admissibility of preliminary references from national institutions. Second subparagraph of Article 19 (1) TEU introduced by the Lisbon Treaty profoundly changed the content of EU law and with delivery of Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses judgement, the importance of which may be equated with Van Gen den Loos judgement, it became clear that the principle of judicial independence ratione materiae comes within the scope of EU law and establishes the imperative addressed to EU Member States to effectively ensure the independence of national judiciary. According to the article, the practice of the Court of Justice shows that functionally Article 267 TFEU and second subparagraph of Article 19 (1) TEU are independent and do not have an impact on the scope/grounds of application of each other. Second subparagraph of Article 19 (1) TEU does not expand the scope of application of Article 267 TFEU. However, Banco Santander judgement indicates that in terms of content of the principle of judicial independence, these provisions complement each other, and this mutual reinforcement may result in a necessity to re-evaluate, whether a particular national institution asking for a preliminary ruling satisfies the criteria of judicial independence developed in EU law. Finally, authors conclude that jurisprudence of the Court of Justice developing second subparagraph of Article 19 (1) TEU may not be interpreted as meaning that EU Member States are not free to decide how to organise their judicial systems, ensure their smooth functioning. However, by doing this they have the obligation to effectively ensure the principle of judicial independence stemming from EU law. Miasto Łowitz judgment allowed to purify the grounds of application of second subparagraph of Article 19 (1) TEU in the context of preliminary rulings procedure, to indicate that this provision is applicable both in cases of application of substantial as well as procedural law. Such an approach allows a further consistent development of jurisprudence specifying both the scope of application and the content of the principle of judicial independence by the Court of Justice