Add to ORKGThis paper compares emission taxes with emission reduction subsidies regarding the incentives they create to enhance technology diffusion under imperfect competition. Finns can adopt a "dirty" technology or a "clean" abatement technology. If the clean and dirty products are perfect substitutes, and clean firms face a net absolute advantage over dirty firms, taxes provide the strongest incentive. This ranking is reversed if there is a distortion on output. Subsidies can neutralize this distortion because output supply is stimulated, which would normally be lower than optimal under perfect competition.</p
Using two-period models, we compare innovation incentives at the industry level offered by five envi...
This paper re-considers environmental subsidies in the context where pol-luting firms procure their ...
We develop a general equilibrium multi-sector vintage capital model with energy-saving technological...
This paper compares emission taxes with emission reduction subsidies regarding the incentives they c...
This paper compares taxes and tradable permits when used to regulate a competitive and polluting dow...
The paper studies the use of emission taxes and feed-in subsidies for the regulation of a monopoly t...
Asymmetric regulation of a global pollutant between countries can alter the competitiveness of indus...
Asymmetric regulation of a global pollutant between countries can alter the competitiveness of indus...
Previous studies suggest that emissions taxes are more efficient at stimulating the development of i...
We analyze how the implementation of an emission tax influences aggregate pollution through the diff...
This paper investigates the optimal environmental policy (the mix of emissions tax and research and ...
Abstract The paper studies the use of emission taxes and feed-in subsidies for the regulation of a m...
We analyze diffusion of an abatement technology in an imperfectly competitive industry under a stand...
This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects ...
We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&D with s...
Using two-period models, we compare innovation incentives at the industry level offered by five envi...
This paper re-considers environmental subsidies in the context where pol-luting firms procure their ...
We develop a general equilibrium multi-sector vintage capital model with energy-saving technological...
This paper compares emission taxes with emission reduction subsidies regarding the incentives they c...
This paper compares taxes and tradable permits when used to regulate a competitive and polluting dow...
The paper studies the use of emission taxes and feed-in subsidies for the regulation of a monopoly t...
Asymmetric regulation of a global pollutant between countries can alter the competitiveness of indus...
Asymmetric regulation of a global pollutant between countries can alter the competitiveness of indus...
Previous studies suggest that emissions taxes are more efficient at stimulating the development of i...
We analyze how the implementation of an emission tax influences aggregate pollution through the diff...
This paper investigates the optimal environmental policy (the mix of emissions tax and research and ...
Abstract The paper studies the use of emission taxes and feed-in subsidies for the regulation of a m...
We analyze diffusion of an abatement technology in an imperfectly competitive industry under a stand...
This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects ...
We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&D with s...
Using two-period models, we compare innovation incentives at the industry level offered by five envi...
This paper re-considers environmental subsidies in the context where pol-luting firms procure their ...
We develop a general equilibrium multi-sector vintage capital model with energy-saving technological...