Neo -Mooreanism, inferential justification, and transmission failure

This dissertation is a collection of essays whose ultimate aim is to challenge the standard view of: The Neo-Moorean Argument (NMA): (1) I have a hand; (2) If I have a hand, then I am not a brain-in-a-vat; (3) Therefore, I am not a brain-in-a-vat. In this literature, philosophers debate whether NMA transmits justification to its conclusion. The transmission of justification is tightly connected with inferential justification: an argument inferentially justifies its conclusion by transmitting justification from its premises to its conclusion. Hence, these philosophers are really concerned with whether NMA inferentially justifies its conclusion. The standard view is that NMA is an instance of complete transmission failure. In other words, many philosophers maintain that, even if NMA\u27s premises are justified, NMA fails to (inferentially) justify its conclusion to any degree at all. I challenge this standard view and argue that NMA is quite capable of justifying its conclusion. This dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part is composed of three chapters and addresses two foundational issues for any theory of inferential justification (or transmission failure), namely evidential support and higher-level requirements. The second part is the heart of my dissertation and is composed of one chapter. Drawing on the conclusions from the first three chapters, I present an account of inferential justification which entails that NMA transmits justification to its conclusion. This account is most plausible given the denial of a certain theory of perceptual justification. The third part of my dissertation is two chapters and defends my conditions by arguing against that theory of perceptual justification and providing an alternative