I examine the once popular claim according to which interpersonal comparisons of welfare are necessary for social choice. I side with current social choice theorists in emphasizing that, on a narrow construal, this necessity claim is refuted beyond appeal. However, I depart from the opinion presently prevailing in social choice theory in highlighting that on a broader construal, this claim proves not only compatible with, but even comforted by, the current state of the field. I submit that all in all, the most accurate philosophical assessment consists not in flatly rejecting this necessity claim, but in accepting it in a suitably revised form
Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition makes social choice depend only on p...
To evaluate the overall good/welfare of any action, policy or institutional choice we need some way ...
While interpersonal utility comparisons are indispensable to the determination of utility maxima, th...
I examine the once popular claim according to which interpersonal comparisons of welfare are necessa...
Some social choice models assume that precise interpersonal comparisons of utility (either ordinal o...
This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provi...
This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provi...
Suppose it is possible to make approximate interpersonal comparisons of welfare gains and losses. T...
This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provi...
The starting-point of the article is the inconsistency between the established practice of acceptanc...
Most moral and political theories require us to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare. This pose...
It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in absence of interpersonal comparisons of w...
How should we make interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels and differences? One branch of wel...
It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in absence of interpersonal comparisons of w...
On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically meaningf...
Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition makes social choice depend only on p...
To evaluate the overall good/welfare of any action, policy or institutional choice we need some way ...
While interpersonal utility comparisons are indispensable to the determination of utility maxima, th...
I examine the once popular claim according to which interpersonal comparisons of welfare are necessa...
Some social choice models assume that precise interpersonal comparisons of utility (either ordinal o...
This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provi...
This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provi...
Suppose it is possible to make approximate interpersonal comparisons of welfare gains and losses. T...
This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provi...
The starting-point of the article is the inconsistency between the established practice of acceptanc...
Most moral and political theories require us to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare. This pose...
It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in absence of interpersonal comparisons of w...
How should we make interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels and differences? One branch of wel...
It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in absence of interpersonal comparisons of w...
On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically meaningf...
Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition makes social choice depend only on p...
To evaluate the overall good/welfare of any action, policy or institutional choice we need some way ...
While interpersonal utility comparisons are indispensable to the determination of utility maxima, th...