Husserl’s Mereological Argument for Intentional Constitution

In this paper I will attempt to defend the position that there is an ontology proper and peculiar to transcendental phenomenology, and that from this ontological point of view it is possible to understand better Husserl’s insistence that transcendental phenomenology is a well-founded philosophy meeting the requirements of a strict science. I am fully aware that such an approach must face a large number of hermeneutical and theoretical problems. But I also think, on the other hand, that the mere attempt just to sketch this rather novel argument deserves in itself the closest attention and excuses some truisms in my exposition. Therefore I will focus only on the general theses that give support to such a position and I will set aside their appropriate development and justification for another occasion. Such a procedure makes my paper look much more dogmatic than it is. Yet, its only purpose, if I may be specific, is the formulation of a mereological argument leading to Husserl’s mature phenomenology.Peer reviewe