The Limits of the Absolute Consciousness

For some decades after Husserl's death, his idea of a “monadological phenomenology” has been regarded with both suspicion and interest. The suspicion mainly concerns with the metaphysical implications of the concepts of monad and monadology. It could be considered inappropriate for a phenomenological philosophy to endorse a view, that is not only burdened with theological assumptions, but also with theses like the ones concerning the immortality of the soul and the absolute independence of the subjects from each other. These seem to be quite untenable from a purely phenomenological point of view. In what follows, I will show that a phenomenologico-Husserlian understanding of monad cannot be considered to entail per se some metaphysical endorsements which characterize Leibniz' monadology, but a phenomenological monadology also does not allow us to take a definite position concerning such endorsements. I will claim, indeed, that Husserl's monad has to be mainly and exclusively interpreted in epistemological terms. As such, it offers some elements in order to deal with both metaphysical and ontological issues, like pluralism and monism, eternity and teleology, but it is not sufficent to determine them. Since, as Husserl himself claims, the monadological understanding of subjectivity would involve a rephrasing of all phenomenological issues—and, as I suggest, even extra-phenomenological ones —, in what follows I will just offer a schematic assessment of some main features of (a possible) Husserlian concept of monad. In this way, I hope to show what the Husserlian monad's core sense, limits and possible implications are