The perspective of a new philosopher

In this paper, I will show why accounts that defend Nietzsche???s perspectivism by reinterpreting him to be more in line with a traditional epistemic theory are mistaken. First, I will compare what Nietzsche calls the old philosopher (traditional philosophers as we know them) and what he calls the new philosopher. Then, I will examine the traditional account of perspectivism as the view that there is no such thing as one universal, truth claim but instead multiple perspectives and explain how it has been defended against its biggest criticism: the paradox of perspectivism. The paradox of perspectivism states that if perspectivism is to be taken seriously it undermines itself as it becomes just another mere perspective and if it is not taken seriously perspectivism is ultimately reduced to relativism. I will look at how Brian Leiter, R. Lanier Anderson, Steven D. Hales, and Rex Welshon try to defend Nietzsche and I will argue that they fail to capture what Nietzsche is doing with his perspectivism. I argue Nietzsche???s perspectivism is not to be understood as an epistemic or metaphysical claim and, thus, the paradox of perspectivism is not an issue. Rather perspectivism should be understood as the only way we can live life-affirming lives in a nihilistic world within the confines of our human limitations. Under my interpretation, Nietzsche???s perspectivism is saved from being reduced to relativism because all that matters to Nietzsche is meaning. In other words, some values are meaningful and life-affirming and others are nihilistic and lifedenying. That is by rejecting the concept of truth, which is life-denying, Nietzsche is able to once again place meaning in the individual???s perspective and the creation of lifeaffirming values while avoiding relativism by placing more meaning on life-affirming values and rejecting life-denying or nihilistic values