Two Perspectives on Perspectivism: Nietzsche\u27s Attack on the \u27In-Itself\u27

Instead of choosing between reading Nietzsche\u27s perspectivism as a metaphysical thesis or as one relating to his critique of traditional morality, this paper intends to show that these are but two sides of the same coin. As regards the metaphysical position, I argue that perspectivism is a version of idealism that critiques the cogency of the `thing-in-itself,\u27 thereby moving beyond the appearance/reality distinction whilst retaining the fundamental tenant that the subjective contribution to reality is irreducible. As regards Nietzsche\u27s transvaluation of all values, I argue that the notion of perspectivism is utilized to critique the idea of the `Good in-itself,\u27 thereby shifting the focus of morality from that of universally applicable prohibitions and obligations to a sort of virtue ethics in which the subject\u27s unique perspective is given expression in and through their creation of values. Given that, I argue for a certain continuity in Nietzsche\u27s thought, such that perspectivism is best seen as an argument against realism, the basic tenant of which - i.e. the inconceivability of the `in-itself\u27 - remains constant even whilst Nietzsche\u27s interests shift during the evolution of his writings