Despite its conceptual centrality to research in comparative politics and the fact that a single measure—the Laakso-Taagepera index (LT)—is nearly universally employed in empirical research, the question of what is the best way to “count” parties is still an open one. Among other alleged shortcomings, LT has been criticized for over-weighting small parties, especially in the case of a one-party majority. Using seat-shares data from over 300 elections, I have calculated LT as well as an alternative measure (BZ) which employs normalized Banzhaf scores rather than simple party seat shares, as weights. The Banzhaf index is a voting power index which calculates a party’s voting power as a function of its coalitional potential. Though the two mea...
The Institutions of Politics; Design, Workings, and implications ( do not use, ended 1-1-2020
What do the UN Security Council, the Electoral College and a company\u27s board of directors have in...
In this paper we propose a new party-system fragmentation measure as equivalent number of parties th...
This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of rel-evant parties in an assembly. The mos...
This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of rel- evant parties in an assembly. The m...
This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of relevant parties in an assembly. The most...
We investigate the method of power indices to study voting power of members of a legislature that ha...
In the presence of a large lumped category of 'Other' parties the effective number of parties cannot...
The effective number of parties, N = 1/Σp(i)2 (where p(i) is the fractional share of the ith party),...
Previous research claims that the number of parties affects the representation of social cleavages i...
Previous research claims that the number of parties affects the representation of social cleavages i...
This note helps to explain how cabinet-level concentration of power is constrained by party level co...
Voting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf (1965) are derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the ...
The figures below represent the values of three indices: (i) the least squares index (LSq), which me...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
The Institutions of Politics; Design, Workings, and implications ( do not use, ended 1-1-2020
What do the UN Security Council, the Electoral College and a company\u27s board of directors have in...
In this paper we propose a new party-system fragmentation measure as equivalent number of parties th...
This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of rel-evant parties in an assembly. The mos...
This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of rel- evant parties in an assembly. The m...
This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of relevant parties in an assembly. The most...
We investigate the method of power indices to study voting power of members of a legislature that ha...
In the presence of a large lumped category of 'Other' parties the effective number of parties cannot...
The effective number of parties, N = 1/Σp(i)2 (where p(i) is the fractional share of the ith party),...
Previous research claims that the number of parties affects the representation of social cleavages i...
Previous research claims that the number of parties affects the representation of social cleavages i...
This note helps to explain how cabinet-level concentration of power is constrained by party level co...
Voting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf (1965) are derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the ...
The figures below represent the values of three indices: (i) the least squares index (LSq), which me...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
The Institutions of Politics; Design, Workings, and implications ( do not use, ended 1-1-2020
What do the UN Security Council, the Electoral College and a company\u27s board of directors have in...
In this paper we propose a new party-system fragmentation measure as equivalent number of parties th...