Metaethical Minimalism: A Demarcation, Defense, and Development

The aim of this work is to demarcate, develop, and defend the commitments andconsequences of metaethical minimalism. Very roughly, this is the position that acommitment to objective moral truths does not require any accompanying ontologicalcommitments. While there are few, if any, who call themselves “metaethical minimalists”, Iendeavor to uncover existing articulations of metaethical minimalism which have beenpresented under different names, attempting to identify the common ground betweenthem. As I interpret the position, all metaethical minimalists are committed to the samepositive pair of claims (what I call the Objectivity Thesis): “a) Moral truths are stronglymind-independent; b) there are moral truths.” Taken by itself, however, this pair of claimsis not sufficient for differentiating their view from the moral realist’s. Consequently, theminimalist must also articulate that which they are denying about the non-minimalistapproach, or what I call the “negative ontological thesis”. I offer my own version of thisnegative thesis and argue for its dialectical advantages.In Chapters 3 and 4, I focus my attention on attacks on the viability of metaethicalminimalism in the form of two “challenges” that aim to problematize a commitment toobjective moral truths absent any accompanying ontological commitment. Thebig-picture takeaway from these chapters is that minimalism can defend itself by playing tothe dialectical advantage I find for it in Chapter 2 as well as by being creative aboutminimalist constructions/reworkings of plausible principles/lines of reasoning that seemto contradict it.The temptation to embrace quietism is strong among minimalists, but in Chapters5, 6, and 7 I aim to show that there is a positive alternative available for the minimalistinterested in developing a full picture of their position. Chapter 5 is aimed at providing anadequate understanding of the distinction between the objects of purely normativethoughts and objects of thoughts about reality. Building on this are Chapters 6 and 7,which argue in favor of an account of the relationship between emotion and evaluativeknowledge that is consistent with metaethical minimalism