Add to ORKGIn coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared. The predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully. These difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form, as the collection of pairs of buyer-seller in an assignment game. The incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection. Furthermore the relationships with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are drawn
The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of ...
In this paper we study the formation of coalition structures in situations described by a cooperativ...
In this paper we study the formation of coalition structures in situations described by a cooperativ...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of ...
The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of ...
The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of ...
In this paper we study the formation of coalition structures in situations described by a cooperativ...
In this paper we study the formation of coalition structures in situations described by a cooperativ...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits ar...
The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of ...
The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of ...
The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of ...
In this paper we study the formation of coalition structures in situations described by a cooperativ...
In this paper we study the formation of coalition structures in situations described by a cooperativ...