International audienceIn this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a clear Nash equilibrium on the power market that can be used to compute equilibrium prices on both markets as well as the related electricity produced and CO2 emissions released
AbstractThis paper surveys results on Nash equilibrium and its refinements for several variants of t...
In this paper, a price competition model with two heterogeneous players participating in carbon...
The current electricity system has a large number of carbon emissions. As an environmentally friendl...
International audienceIn this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers sellin...
International audienceIn this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers sellin...
International audienceIn this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers sellin...
In this note, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their produ...
International audienceIn this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between ele...
International audienceIn this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between ele...
International audienceIn this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between ele...
International audienceIn this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between ele...
International audienceWe address the problem of electricity producers interacting between an electri...
International audienceWe address the problem of electricity producers interacting between an electri...
International audienceWe address the problem of electricity producers interacting between an electri...
International audienceWe address the problem of electricity producers interacting between an electri...
AbstractThis paper surveys results on Nash equilibrium and its refinements for several variants of t...
In this paper, a price competition model with two heterogeneous players participating in carbon...
The current electricity system has a large number of carbon emissions. As an environmentally friendl...
International audienceIn this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers sellin...
International audienceIn this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers sellin...
International audienceIn this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers sellin...
In this note, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their produ...
International audienceIn this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between ele...
International audienceIn this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between ele...
International audienceIn this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between ele...
International audienceIn this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between ele...
International audienceWe address the problem of electricity producers interacting between an electri...
International audienceWe address the problem of electricity producers interacting between an electri...
International audienceWe address the problem of electricity producers interacting between an electri...
International audienceWe address the problem of electricity producers interacting between an electri...
AbstractThis paper surveys results on Nash equilibrium and its refinements for several variants of t...
In this paper, a price competition model with two heterogeneous players participating in carbon...
The current electricity system has a large number of carbon emissions. As an environmentally friendl...