Add to ORKGThis short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade multiple receivers, possibly having heterogenous beliefs, with the same information for all. We show that public persuasion constrains the sender in how he can influence the beliefs of receivers: if the sender wants to influence the beliefs of one particular receiver, he loses all controls over the beliefs of the others. This observation partially generalizes to targeted persuasion
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
A sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a public sig...
In a world where rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the b...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with r...
This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with r...
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with r...
This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with r...
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
A sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a public sig...
In a world where rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the b...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade mu...
This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with r...
This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with r...
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with r...
This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with r...
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
A sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a public sig...
In a world where rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the b...