This thesis studies the analysis of cryptographic protocols. They are sequences of instructions permitting to interact with a recipient remotely while protecting the sensitive content of the communication from a potential malicious third party. Classical cases where the confidentiality and the integrity of the communication are critical are, among others, online payments and medical-service booking, or electronic voting. We study notions of security defined technically by observational equivalences (which includes among others confidentiality, anonymity or non-traceability). We designed a program, DeepSec, which, from the description of a protocol for a fixed number of participants, verifies in a fully-automated way whether the protocol off...
This thesis presents methods to verify cryptographic protocolsin the symbolic model: formal methods ...
Programs commonly perform computations involving secret data, relying on cryptographic code to guara...
Formal methods have been very successful in analyzing security protocols for reachability properties...
Cette thèse porte sur l’analyse des protocoles cryptographiques. Ce sont des suites d’instructions p...
Security protocols are programs that secure communications by defining exchange rules on a network. ...
Security properties of cryptographic protocols are typically expressed as reachability or equivalenc...
Les protocoles cryptographiques constituent la base de la sécurité des communications faites le long...
Verification of privacy-type properties for cryptographic protocols in an active adversarial environ...
Plusieurs outils ont été développé pour vérifier automatiquement les propriétés de sécurité sur des ...
Plusieurs outils ont été développé pour vérifier automatiquement les propriétés de sécurité sur des ...
With the rise of the Internet the use of cryptographic protocols became ubiquitous. Considering the ...
À mesure que le nombre d’objets capables de communiquer croît, le besoin de sécuriser leurs interact...
International audienceVerification of privacy-type properties for cryptographic protocols in an acti...
Many security properties are naturally expressed as indistinguishability between two versions of a p...
This thesis is developed in the framework of the symbolic analysis of security protocols. The contri...
This thesis presents methods to verify cryptographic protocolsin the symbolic model: formal methods ...
Programs commonly perform computations involving secret data, relying on cryptographic code to guara...
Formal methods have been very successful in analyzing security protocols for reachability properties...
Cette thèse porte sur l’analyse des protocoles cryptographiques. Ce sont des suites d’instructions p...
Security protocols are programs that secure communications by defining exchange rules on a network. ...
Security properties of cryptographic protocols are typically expressed as reachability or equivalenc...
Les protocoles cryptographiques constituent la base de la sécurité des communications faites le long...
Verification of privacy-type properties for cryptographic protocols in an active adversarial environ...
Plusieurs outils ont été développé pour vérifier automatiquement les propriétés de sécurité sur des ...
Plusieurs outils ont été développé pour vérifier automatiquement les propriétés de sécurité sur des ...
With the rise of the Internet the use of cryptographic protocols became ubiquitous. Considering the ...
À mesure que le nombre d’objets capables de communiquer croît, le besoin de sécuriser leurs interact...
International audienceVerification of privacy-type properties for cryptographic protocols in an acti...
Many security properties are naturally expressed as indistinguishability between two versions of a p...
This thesis is developed in the framework of the symbolic analysis of security protocols. The contri...
This thesis presents methods to verify cryptographic protocolsin the symbolic model: formal methods ...
Programs commonly perform computations involving secret data, relying on cryptographic code to guara...
Formal methods have been very successful in analyzing security protocols for reachability properties...