Many security properties are naturally expressed as indistinguishability between two versions of a protocol. In this paper, we show that computational proofs of indistinguishability can be considerably simplified, for a class of processes that covers most existing protocols. More precisely, we show a soundness theorem, following the line of research launched by Abadi and Rogaway in 2000: computational indistinguishability in presence of an active attacker is implied by the observational equivalence of the corresponding symbolic processes. Up to our knowledge, the only result of this kind is Adao and Fournet, in which, however, cryptographic primitives are not part of the syntax. Otherwise, previous works either considered a passive attacker...
International audienceSecurity protocols are short programs that aim at securing communication over ...
The continuous technological progress and the constant growing of information flow we observe every ...
This thesis studies the analysis of cryptographic protocols. They are sequences of instructions perm...
Many security properties are naturally expressed as indistinguishability between two versions of a p...
Notre société utilise de nombreux systèmes de communications. Parce que ces systèmes sont omniprésen...
Verification of privacy-type properties for cryptographic protocols in an active adversarial environ...
Cette thèse s'inscrit dans le domaine de la vérification de protocoles cryptographiques dans le modè...
Security properties of cryptographic protocols are typically expressed as reachability or equivalenc...
International audienceThere are two main frameworks for analyzing cryptographic systems; the symboli...
Since the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols. One of the app...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comInternational audienceIndistinguishabil...
Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verification of cryptographic protocols. The...
Recently, we proposed a technique [1] to define a com-putationally complete symbolic attacker for th...
International audienceVerification of privacy-type properties for cryptographic protocols in an acti...
We consider the question of the adequacy of symbolic models versus computational models for the veri...
International audienceSecurity protocols are short programs that aim at securing communication over ...
The continuous technological progress and the constant growing of information flow we observe every ...
This thesis studies the analysis of cryptographic protocols. They are sequences of instructions perm...
Many security properties are naturally expressed as indistinguishability between two versions of a p...
Notre société utilise de nombreux systèmes de communications. Parce que ces systèmes sont omniprésen...
Verification of privacy-type properties for cryptographic protocols in an active adversarial environ...
Cette thèse s'inscrit dans le domaine de la vérification de protocoles cryptographiques dans le modè...
Security properties of cryptographic protocols are typically expressed as reachability or equivalenc...
International audienceThere are two main frameworks for analyzing cryptographic systems; the symboli...
Since the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols. One of the app...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comInternational audienceIndistinguishabil...
Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verification of cryptographic protocols. The...
Recently, we proposed a technique [1] to define a com-putationally complete symbolic attacker for th...
International audienceVerification of privacy-type properties for cryptographic protocols in an acti...
We consider the question of the adequacy of symbolic models versus computational models for the veri...
International audienceSecurity protocols are short programs that aim at securing communication over ...
The continuous technological progress and the constant growing of information flow we observe every ...
This thesis studies the analysis of cryptographic protocols. They are sequences of instructions perm...