Whether or not arthropods are sentient, they can have moral standing. Appeals to sentience are not necessary and retard progress in human treatment of other species, including invertebrates. Other increasingly well-documented aspects of invertebrate minds are pertinent to their welfare. Even if arthropods are not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and therefore interests—can be frustrated. This kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and requires that we consider their welfare
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue for considering the welfare of invertebrates, especially insects, ...
In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to ...
There is no way to include invertebrates within the moral sphere without being “extreme” — to use Mi...
—Commentary on Mikhalevich and Powell on invertebrate minds.— Whether or not arthropods are sentient...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the ...
Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) set up the basic criteria for according moral status equitably, including...
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that the exclusion of the vast majority of arthropods from moral standing...
Welfare protections for vertebrates are grounded in the belief that vertebrates are sentient and cap...
Mikhalevich and Powell (2020) argue that it is both scientifically and morally wrong to dismiss the ...
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sent...
Neither sentience nor moral standing is confined to animals with large or human-like brains. Inverte...
Invertebrate animals are frequently lumped into a single category and denied welfare protections des...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve inclusion in an...
Invertebrate animals are frequently lumped into a single category and denied welfare protections des...
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but w...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue for considering the welfare of invertebrates, especially insects, ...
In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to ...
There is no way to include invertebrates within the moral sphere without being “extreme” — to use Mi...
—Commentary on Mikhalevich and Powell on invertebrate minds.— Whether or not arthropods are sentient...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the ...
Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) set up the basic criteria for according moral status equitably, including...
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that the exclusion of the vast majority of arthropods from moral standing...
Welfare protections for vertebrates are grounded in the belief that vertebrates are sentient and cap...
Mikhalevich and Powell (2020) argue that it is both scientifically and morally wrong to dismiss the ...
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sent...
Neither sentience nor moral standing is confined to animals with large or human-like brains. Inverte...
Invertebrate animals are frequently lumped into a single category and denied welfare protections des...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve inclusion in an...
Invertebrate animals are frequently lumped into a single category and denied welfare protections des...
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but w...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue for considering the welfare of invertebrates, especially insects, ...
In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to ...
There is no way to include invertebrates within the moral sphere without being “extreme” — to use Mi...