Add to ORKGWe should treat sentient nonhuman animals as worthy of moral consideration, not because we share an evolutionary history with them, but because they can suffer. As Chapman & Huffman (2018) argue, humans are not uniquely disconnected from other species. We should minimize the suffering we inflict on sentient beings — whether human or nonhuman — not because they, too, are tool-makers or have sophisticated communication systems, but because they, too, can suffer, and suffering is bad
Chapman & Huffman argue that the cognitive differences between humans and nonhuman animals do not ma...
Animal rights philosophers have traditionally accepted the claim that human beings are unique, but r...
What criteria can we legitimately use to judge moral worth? What morally relevant differences or sim...
We should treat sentient nonhuman animals as worthy of moral consideration, not because we share an ...
We agree with Chapman & Huffman that human capacities are often assumed to be unique — or attempts a...
A focus on animal welfare in the use of nonhuman animals in the service of human economic and scient...
Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and non-human a...
Our commentators come from many fields and disciplines and express highly divergent views, illustrat...
If many wild animals have net negative lives, then we have to consider how likely it is that the goo...
I qualify two criticisms made by commentators on Chapman & Huffman’s target article. Responding to t...
This commentary discusses various shortcomings in Chapman & Huffman’s (2018) denial of differences b...
Treves et al. are right about the need for morally just preservation of nonhumans. Their suggestions...
In this brief paper, I will defend the position that while sentient animals are morally considerable...
The goal of Animal Welfare Science to reduce animal suffering is commendable but too modest: Sufferi...
Human beings have long treated animals not as sentient beings, but as objects or products to be used...
Chapman & Huffman argue that the cognitive differences between humans and nonhuman animals do not ma...
Animal rights philosophers have traditionally accepted the claim that human beings are unique, but r...
What criteria can we legitimately use to judge moral worth? What morally relevant differences or sim...
We should treat sentient nonhuman animals as worthy of moral consideration, not because we share an ...
We agree with Chapman & Huffman that human capacities are often assumed to be unique — or attempts a...
A focus on animal welfare in the use of nonhuman animals in the service of human economic and scient...
Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and non-human a...
Our commentators come from many fields and disciplines and express highly divergent views, illustrat...
If many wild animals have net negative lives, then we have to consider how likely it is that the goo...
I qualify two criticisms made by commentators on Chapman & Huffman’s target article. Responding to t...
This commentary discusses various shortcomings in Chapman & Huffman’s (2018) denial of differences b...
Treves et al. are right about the need for morally just preservation of nonhumans. Their suggestions...
In this brief paper, I will defend the position that while sentient animals are morally considerable...
The goal of Animal Welfare Science to reduce animal suffering is commendable but too modest: Sufferi...
Human beings have long treated animals not as sentient beings, but as objects or products to be used...
Chapman & Huffman argue that the cognitive differences between humans and nonhuman animals do not ma...
Animal rights philosophers have traditionally accepted the claim that human beings are unique, but r...
What criteria can we legitimately use to judge moral worth? What morally relevant differences or sim...