La contrarreforma del Consejo General del Poder Judicial

The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges’ independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers’ pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as a consequence of the reinforcement of its president’s powers and transfers a substantial part of its former competences to the Executive power. It is a deliberate setback to the pre-constitutional way of governing the judiciary: a genuine Counter-Reform.El Consejo General del Poder Judicial ha sido ineficaz en su misión constitucional de ayudar a defender la independencia de jueces y tribunales frente a presiones de los demás poderes, dignificados o eficientes. La forma en que se designa a sus integrantes y el modo en que éstos eligen luego a los principales cargos judiciales ha puesto de manifiesto su dependencia de los partidos políticos. Pero la reforma de 2013 no resuelve estos problemas, incumple previsiones constitucionales de pluralismo en su composición y de colegialidad y añade otros nuevos como consecuencia de su presidencialismo y transfiere una parte sustancial de sus poderes al Ejecutivo. Supone un retroceso deliberado hacia el sistema de gobierno preconstitucional: una genuina Contrarreforma.The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges’ independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers’ pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as a consequence of the reinforcement of its president’s powers and transfers a substantial part of its former competences to the Executive power. It is a deliberate setback to the pre-constitutional way of governing the judiciary: a genuine Counter-Reform