On the appointment of the President and Members of the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary. A reflection from common sense

La independencia judicial es un principio subjetivo clave del poder judicial democrático. La ciudadanía espera, ante todo, que quien detenta el poder del estado para resolver su conflicto sea ajeno a él, objetivo e imparcial. Un peligro acecha cuando el sistema de nombramiento de los jueces, al menos de los más importantes (los llamados altos tribunales), depende directamente del poder político y no se deja al propio poder judicial, o dependiendo sólo del poder judicial, la composición de la correspondiente comisión está influida claramente por el poder político. No hay un sistema de nombramiento de los altos jueces perfecto, el español tampoco lo es por el control político del Consejo General del Poder Judicial. Se analizan aquí las causas, los efectos y las posibilidades de mejora, para garantizar mejor la independencia judicial.Judicial independence is a key subjective principle of the democratic judiciary. Citizens expect, first and foremost, that whoever holds the State’s power to resolve their conflict is unrelated to it, objective and impartial. Danger lurks when the system of appointment of judges, at least of the most important ones (the so-called high courts), depends directly on the political power and is not left to the judicial power itself, or depending only on the judiciary, the composition of the corresponding commission is clearly influenced by the political power. There is no perfect system for appointing high judges, nor is the Spanish system due to the political control of the General Council of the Judiciary. The causes, effects and possibilities of improvement are analysed in this paper, in order to better guarantee judicial independence