Add to ORKGAn advisor is supposed to recommend a nancial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers) to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not, will a voluntary or obligatory payment by a client induce more truthful advice? According to the results, only the voluntary payment reduces the con ict of interest faced by advisors
In this paper, we study the interaction between financial advisors and customers with a potential co...
We use minutes from 17,000 financial advisory sessions and corresponding client portfolio data to st...
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad a...
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However,...
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by informat...
Clients’ satisfaction with financial advice provided by professional advisors depends on how this ad...
This paper investigates the determinants of the compensation structure for brokers who advise custom...
The financial advice profession provides a potentially valuable service to consumers within an incre...
Using a unique administrative data set from a large German commercial bank, this paper aims to ascer...
Preliminary Version This paper investigates whether financial advisors help clients improve their in...
Zhuoqiong Chen, PhD student in Business Economics, experimentally analyses that removing commissions...
Using detailed data on financial advisors and their clients, we show that conflicts of interest matt...
Investors usually resort to financial advisors to improve their investment process until the point o...
This experiment shows that varying the commission received by financial advisors strongly influences...
In this paper, we study the interaction between financial advisors and customers with a potential co...
In this paper, we study the interaction between financial advisors and customers with a potential co...
We use minutes from 17,000 financial advisory sessions and corresponding client portfolio data to st...
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad a...
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However,...
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by informat...
Clients’ satisfaction with financial advice provided by professional advisors depends on how this ad...
This paper investigates the determinants of the compensation structure for brokers who advise custom...
The financial advice profession provides a potentially valuable service to consumers within an incre...
Using a unique administrative data set from a large German commercial bank, this paper aims to ascer...
Preliminary Version This paper investigates whether financial advisors help clients improve their in...
Zhuoqiong Chen, PhD student in Business Economics, experimentally analyses that removing commissions...
Using detailed data on financial advisors and their clients, we show that conflicts of interest matt...
Investors usually resort to financial advisors to improve their investment process until the point o...
This experiment shows that varying the commission received by financial advisors strongly influences...
In this paper, we study the interaction between financial advisors and customers with a potential co...
In this paper, we study the interaction between financial advisors and customers with a potential co...
We use minutes from 17,000 financial advisory sessions and corresponding client portfolio data to st...
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad a...