Add to ORKGZhuoqiong Chen, PhD student in Business Economics, experimentally analyses that removing commissions in the financial services does not restore impartial advice
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad a...
Clients’ satisfaction with financial advice provided by professional advisors depends on how this ad...
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal can cancel an action initially starte...
Regulatory authorities have consulted on the option of banning embedded sales commissions for Canadi...
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However,...
To prevent biased advice, regulators increasingly ban commission payments to financial advisers. Suc...
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2020Sales commissions may present a conflict of interest t...
Expert advice is often biased in ways that benefit the advisor. We demonstrate how self-deception he...
The financial advice profession provides a potentially valuable service to consumers within an incre...
The regulatory structure for financial advice now tolerates incentives motivating financial advisors...
An advisor is supposed to recommend a nancial product in the best interest of her client. However, ...
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by informat...
We show that a one-off incentive to bias advice has persistent effects. In an experiment, advisers w...
DR-LEO 2008-21"Sell-side"analysts advise fund managers with recommendations to buy or sell a stock. ...
This paper studies expert advice when an influence-hungry expert derives an intrinsic benefit from infl...
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad a...
Clients’ satisfaction with financial advice provided by professional advisors depends on how this ad...
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal can cancel an action initially starte...
Regulatory authorities have consulted on the option of banning embedded sales commissions for Canadi...
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However,...
To prevent biased advice, regulators increasingly ban commission payments to financial advisers. Suc...
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2020Sales commissions may present a conflict of interest t...
Expert advice is often biased in ways that benefit the advisor. We demonstrate how self-deception he...
The financial advice profession provides a potentially valuable service to consumers within an incre...
The regulatory structure for financial advice now tolerates incentives motivating financial advisors...
An advisor is supposed to recommend a nancial product in the best interest of her client. However, ...
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by informat...
We show that a one-off incentive to bias advice has persistent effects. In an experiment, advisers w...
DR-LEO 2008-21"Sell-side"analysts advise fund managers with recommendations to buy or sell a stock. ...
This paper studies expert advice when an influence-hungry expert derives an intrinsic benefit from infl...
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad a...
Clients’ satisfaction with financial advice provided by professional advisors depends on how this ad...
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal can cancel an action initially starte...