Essays on R&D-races and Cournot oligopoly

Defence date: 17 March 2000Examining Board: Prof. Fernando Branco, Catholic University of Lisbon; Prof. Vincenzo Denicolò, University of Bologna; Prof. James Dow, London Business School (Supervisor); Prof. Massimo Motta, European University Institute (Internal advisor); Prof. Karl Schlag, European University InstituteFirst made available 27 February 2018This thesis was written out of the desire to gain a deeper understanding of competition in imperfect markets, in particular oligopolies. Firms have many possible strategies at their disposal that may effect present and future payoffs, and the structure of their markets. In the first two chapters we study R&D and innovation, that have received an ever increasing amount of interest, for a variety of market frameworks, including Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, and repeated patent races. Here firms compete by innovating; we study how they do it, and in which direction competition will evolve. Still, many questions remain unanswered even in now classic static models of oligopoly, as the Cournot oligopoly, which he have used as a building block in the first two chapters. In chapter 3, we set out to examine the equally classical questions of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, and the reaction of the market to the entry of new firms. Our analysis is innovative since it deals with heterogeneous goods and makes use of a very new set of methods.-- Dynamic R&D competition with endogenous targets -- A note on step-by-step races -- Heterogeneous Cournot oligopolie