Four essays on dynamic evolutionary models in economics and game theory

Defence date: 15 March 1993Examining board: Peter Hammond, Stanford University ; Prof. Christopher Harris, Nuffield College, Oxford ; Prof. Alan Kirman, E.U.I., supervisor ; Prof. Robert Waldmann, E.U.I. ; Prof. Stefano Zamagni, University of BolognaPDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017-- Noise traders permanence in stock markets : an evolutionary approach -- Evolutionary selection of correlation mechanisms for coordination games -- Coevolution of social norms with noisy enforcement -- Bertrand vs. Cournot : an evolutionary approachChapter 3 ' Evolutionary selection of correlation mechanisms for coordination games' generalizes previous work by ourselves [Sacco, P.L. 1992. “On the Dynamics of Social Norms.” Preprint, presented at the Second Workshop on Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, Castiglioncello