In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is conf...
Behavior in the Ultimatum Game has been well-studied experimentally, and provides a marked contrast ...
Antisocial punishment-punishment of pro-social cooperators-has shown to be detrimental for the effic...
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in- complete in a systematic way using...
In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the resp...
The current study investigated two types of punishment (prosocial and proself punishment) in the ult...
Economic games such as the Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) are widely used paradigms...
Evolutionary theory reveals that punishment is effective in promoting cooperation and maintaining so...
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behav...
<div><p>Behavior in the Ultimatum Game has been well-studied experimentally, and provides a marked c...
We examine rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer first makes an ...
Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection...
In experimental games, many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest and they do that...
We explores the motivations behind costly punishment in social dilemmas, specifically focusing on re...
Experiments on the Ultimatum Game (UG) repeatedly show that people''s behaviour is far from rational...
The ultimatum game (UG) is widely used to study human bargaining behavior and fairness norms. In thi...
Behavior in the Ultimatum Game has been well-studied experimentally, and provides a marked contrast ...
Antisocial punishment-punishment of pro-social cooperators-has shown to be detrimental for the effic...
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in- complete in a systematic way using...
In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the resp...
The current study investigated two types of punishment (prosocial and proself punishment) in the ult...
Economic games such as the Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) are widely used paradigms...
Evolutionary theory reveals that punishment is effective in promoting cooperation and maintaining so...
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behav...
<div><p>Behavior in the Ultimatum Game has been well-studied experimentally, and provides a marked c...
We examine rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer first makes an ...
Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection...
In experimental games, many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest and they do that...
We explores the motivations behind costly punishment in social dilemmas, specifically focusing on re...
Experiments on the Ultimatum Game (UG) repeatedly show that people''s behaviour is far from rational...
The ultimatum game (UG) is widely used to study human bargaining behavior and fairness norms. In thi...
Behavior in the Ultimatum Game has been well-studied experimentally, and provides a marked contrast ...
Antisocial punishment-punishment of pro-social cooperators-has shown to be detrimental for the effic...
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in- complete in a systematic way using...