Add to ORKGThe value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone’s payoffs can reduce welfare
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the relationship between equity and coordin...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding...
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
Abstract This paper presents experimental evidence on coordination games with two Pareto-rankable eq...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in whi...
This article is devoted to explaining and justifying the choice of salient equilibria or focal point...
This article is devoted to explaining and justifying the choice of salient equilibria or focal point...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
The authors report experiments on how players select among multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria in a co...
We compare the experimental results of three stag-hunt games. In contrast to Battalio et al. (2001),...
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the relationship between equity and coordin...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding...
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
Abstract This paper presents experimental evidence on coordination games with two Pareto-rankable eq...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in whi...
This article is devoted to explaining and justifying the choice of salient equilibria or focal point...
This article is devoted to explaining and justifying the choice of salient equilibria or focal point...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
The authors report experiments on how players select among multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria in a co...
We compare the experimental results of three stag-hunt games. In contrast to Battalio et al. (2001),...
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the relationship between equity and coordin...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...