The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone's payoffs can reduce welfare
This survey article starts with a game-theoretic interpretation of coordination problems that occur ...
This paper introduces similarity among strategies in the payoff assessment model of choice (Sarin an...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding...
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding...
Abstract This paper presents experimental evidence on coordination games with two Pareto-rankable eq...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
This article is devoted to explaining and justifying the choice of salient equilibria or focal point...
This article is devoted to explaining and justifying the choice of salient equilibria or focal point...
We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in whi...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
The authors report experiments on how players select among multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria in a co...
Coordination problems arise in a multitude of economic interactions. Recent advances in the field of...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
We compare the experimental results of three stag-hunt games. In contrast to Battalio et al. (2001),...
This survey article starts with a game-theoretic interpretation of coordination problems that occur ...
This paper introduces similarity among strategies in the payoff assessment model of choice (Sarin an...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding...
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding...
Abstract This paper presents experimental evidence on coordination games with two Pareto-rankable eq...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
This article is devoted to explaining and justifying the choice of salient equilibria or focal point...
This article is devoted to explaining and justifying the choice of salient equilibria or focal point...
We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in whi...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
The authors report experiments on how players select among multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria in a co...
Coordination problems arise in a multitude of economic interactions. Recent advances in the field of...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...
We compare the experimental results of three stag-hunt games. In contrast to Battalio et al. (2001),...
This survey article starts with a game-theoretic interpretation of coordination problems that occur ...
This paper introduces similarity among strategies in the payoff assessment model of choice (Sarin an...
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strate...