This study exploits contract-level data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of a new credit registry on the use of borrower collateral versus third-party guarantees. Among first-time borrowers, the introduction of mandatory information sharing leads to a shift from collateral to guarantees, in particular for riskier borrowers. Among repeat borrowers, both collateral and guarantee requirements decline in proportion to the length of the lending relationship. These results suggest that information sharing can both reduce adverse selection among new borrowers and hold-up problems among repeat borrowers
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
An important theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse selec...
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protec...
This study exploits contract-level data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of a new cr...
We exploit detailed data on approved and rejected small business loans to assess the impact of the i...
This is the authors’ accepted, refereed and final manuscript to the article. Publisher’s versi...
Information sharing and collateral reduce adverse selection costs, but are costly for lenders. When ...
We analyze contract-level data on approved and rejected microloans to assess the impact of a new cre...
An impressive theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that reduces equilibrium cr...
This study tests the simultaneous impact of observed characteristics and private information on debt...
We investigate the impact of lenders ’ information sharing on firms ’ performance in the credit mark...
Abstract. Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poo...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
Abstract: When a customer can borrow from several competing banks, multiple lending raises default r...
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link b...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
An important theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse selec...
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protec...
This study exploits contract-level data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of a new cr...
We exploit detailed data on approved and rejected small business loans to assess the impact of the i...
This is the authors’ accepted, refereed and final manuscript to the article. Publisher’s versi...
Information sharing and collateral reduce adverse selection costs, but are costly for lenders. When ...
We analyze contract-level data on approved and rejected microloans to assess the impact of a new cre...
An impressive theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that reduces equilibrium cr...
This study tests the simultaneous impact of observed characteristics and private information on debt...
We investigate the impact of lenders ’ information sharing on firms ’ performance in the credit mark...
Abstract. Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poo...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
Abstract: When a customer can borrow from several competing banks, multiple lending raises default r...
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link b...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
An important theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse selec...
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protec...