Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory. One is understanding the rules and structure of the game and the other is forming beliefs about the behavior of other players. Typically, these two dimensions cannot be disentangled as belief formation crucially depends on the understanding of the game. We present the one-player guessing game, a variation of the two-player guessing game (Grosskopf and Nagel 2008), which turns an otherwise strategic game into an individual decision-making task. The results show that a majority of subjects fail to understand the structure of the game. Moreover, subjects with a better understanding of the structure of the game form more accurate beliefs of other playe...
We examine strategic sophistication using eight two-person 3 x 3 one-shot games. To facilitate strat...
Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. We introduce the ‘returns-base...
Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. We introduce the ‘returns-base...
Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory. One is...
This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects' initial responses to 16 dominance-solvable t...
This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects' initial responses to 16 dominance-solvable t...
We study experimentally the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominancesolvable gue...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate whether players ’ actions can be viewed as responses to...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate whether players' actions can be viewed as responses to ...
This paper focuses on instructions and procedures as the reasons that subjects fail to behave accord...
We study experimentally the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-solvable gu...
We report experimental results on a series of ten one-shot two-person 3x3 normal form games with uni...
Abstract: We study experimentally the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-s...
We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economist...
We replicate an experiment previously reported in this journal (Güth, Kocher and Sutter 2002). Our ...
We examine strategic sophistication using eight two-person 3 x 3 one-shot games. To facilitate strat...
Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. We introduce the ‘returns-base...
Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. We introduce the ‘returns-base...
Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory. One is...
This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects' initial responses to 16 dominance-solvable t...
This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects' initial responses to 16 dominance-solvable t...
We study experimentally the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominancesolvable gue...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate whether players ’ actions can be viewed as responses to...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate whether players' actions can be viewed as responses to ...
This paper focuses on instructions and procedures as the reasons that subjects fail to behave accord...
We study experimentally the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-solvable gu...
We report experimental results on a series of ten one-shot two-person 3x3 normal form games with uni...
Abstract: We study experimentally the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-s...
We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economist...
We replicate an experiment previously reported in this journal (Güth, Kocher and Sutter 2002). Our ...
We examine strategic sophistication using eight two-person 3 x 3 one-shot games. To facilitate strat...
Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. We introduce the ‘returns-base...
Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. We introduce the ‘returns-base...