We consider a population of dynamic agents, also referred to as players. The state of each player evolves according to a linear stochastic differential equation driven by a Brownian motion and under the influence of a control and an adversarial disturbance. Every player minimizes a cost functional which involves quadratic terms on state and control plus a crosscoupling mean-field term measuring the congestion resulting from the collective behavior, which motivates the term “crowdaverse”. Motivations for this model are analyzed and discussed in three main contexts: a stock market application, a production engineering example, and a dynamic demand management problem in power systems. For the problem in its abstract formulation, we illustrate ...
The purpose of this paper is to provide a complete probabilistic analysis of a large class of stocha...
We formulate and analyze a mathematical framework for continuous-time mean field games with finitely...
In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominant leader and a large group of followe...
We consider a population of dynamic agents, also referred to as players. The state of each player ev...
We consider a population of dynamic agents, also referred to as players. The state of each player ev...
We consider a population of dynamic agents, also referred to as players. The state of each player ev...
For a networked controlled system we illustrate the paradigm of robust mean-field games. This is a m...
In this paper, we study mean field games under uncertainty. We consider a population of players with...
Recently there has been renewed interest in large-scale games in several research disciplines, with ...
International audienceIn this paper, we study mean field games under uncertainty. We consider a popu...
This thesis investigates mean field games and related models of dynamic agent behaviour, along with ...
For a population of electric vehicles (EVs) we design a datadriven mean-field game and provide analy...
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...
We consider robust stochastic large population games for coupled Markov jump linear systems (MJLSs)....
© 2014 IEEE. A large population of agents seeking to regulate their state to values characterized by...
The purpose of this paper is to provide a complete probabilistic analysis of a large class of stocha...
We formulate and analyze a mathematical framework for continuous-time mean field games with finitely...
In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominant leader and a large group of followe...
We consider a population of dynamic agents, also referred to as players. The state of each player ev...
We consider a population of dynamic agents, also referred to as players. The state of each player ev...
We consider a population of dynamic agents, also referred to as players. The state of each player ev...
For a networked controlled system we illustrate the paradigm of robust mean-field games. This is a m...
In this paper, we study mean field games under uncertainty. We consider a population of players with...
Recently there has been renewed interest in large-scale games in several research disciplines, with ...
International audienceIn this paper, we study mean field games under uncertainty. We consider a popu...
This thesis investigates mean field games and related models of dynamic agent behaviour, along with ...
For a population of electric vehicles (EVs) we design a datadriven mean-field game and provide analy...
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...
We consider robust stochastic large population games for coupled Markov jump linear systems (MJLSs)....
© 2014 IEEE. A large population of agents seeking to regulate their state to values characterized by...
The purpose of this paper is to provide a complete probabilistic analysis of a large class of stocha...
We formulate and analyze a mathematical framework for continuous-time mean field games with finitely...
In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominant leader and a large group of followe...