Promissory Estoppel

The general nature and application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel\u27 has been thoroughly discussed in the past by very able commentators. It is not the purpose of this note to enlarge upon these analyses. However, as a basis for a summary of the present status of the doctrine, perhaps a brief review is in order. No proposition of law is more familiar to the legal profession in general than the rule that consideration consists of any legal detriment incurred by the promisee, which was bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.\u27 There are numerous situations in which there is a promise, upon which the promisee has relied to his detriment, which is nevertheless unenforceable under the orthodox view of consideration because the reliance was not the agreed equivalent of the promise. The substantial injustice inherent in such cases is the reason for the development of the rule that reliance on such a promise, under the proper circumstances, will make it enforceable