Many people assume that fictional entities are encapsulated in the world of fiction. I show that this cannot be right. Some works of fiction tell us about pieces of poetry, music, or theatre written by fictional characters. Such creations are fictional creations, as I will call them. Their authors do not exist. But that does not take away that we can perform, recite, or otherwise generate actual instances of such works. This means we can bring such individuals actually into existence, as the works they are. I conclude that the assumption about encapsulation is untenable, unless an exception is made for types
Several philosophers including Kripke have contended that fictional entities do exist as abstract ob...
According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered a...
Readers assume that commonplace properties of the real world also hold in realistic fiction. They ...
Many people assume that fictional entities are encapsulated in the world of fiction. I show that thi...
There are many stories about Sherlock Holmes. Or are there? There never was such a person as Sherloc...
What does it mean for a proposition to be "true in a fiction"? According to the account offered by K...
In the debate on the ontology of fictional entities realists claim that fictional characters exist. ...
According to artefactual theories of fiction, fictional characters are contingently existing abstra...
I present and discuss a counterexample to Kendall Walton's necessary condition for fictionality that...
This thesis develops a metaphysics of fictional objects that is embedded in a theory of fictional pr...
The subject of the work is the problem of the fictionality of literary texts. The work is divided in...
In this paper I confront what I take to be the crucial challenge for fictional realism, i.e. the vie...
In recent metaphysics, the questions of whether fictional entities exist, what their nature is, and ...
The first question to be addressed about fictional entities is: are there any? The usual grounds giv...
We have all been prone to say, in our common-sense usage of exist, that Pegasus does not exist, mean...
Several philosophers including Kripke have contended that fictional entities do exist as abstract ob...
According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered a...
Readers assume that commonplace properties of the real world also hold in realistic fiction. They ...
Many people assume that fictional entities are encapsulated in the world of fiction. I show that thi...
There are many stories about Sherlock Holmes. Or are there? There never was such a person as Sherloc...
What does it mean for a proposition to be "true in a fiction"? According to the account offered by K...
In the debate on the ontology of fictional entities realists claim that fictional characters exist. ...
According to artefactual theories of fiction, fictional characters are contingently existing abstra...
I present and discuss a counterexample to Kendall Walton's necessary condition for fictionality that...
This thesis develops a metaphysics of fictional objects that is embedded in a theory of fictional pr...
The subject of the work is the problem of the fictionality of literary texts. The work is divided in...
In this paper I confront what I take to be the crucial challenge for fictional realism, i.e. the vie...
In recent metaphysics, the questions of whether fictional entities exist, what their nature is, and ...
The first question to be addressed about fictional entities is: are there any? The usual grounds giv...
We have all been prone to say, in our common-sense usage of exist, that Pegasus does not exist, mean...
Several philosophers including Kripke have contended that fictional entities do exist as abstract ob...
According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered a...
Readers assume that commonplace properties of the real world also hold in realistic fiction. They ...