In this thesis, we examine discrete and continuous models of competitive flows over time. The general idea of these models is that selfishly acting players travel over time through some network and influence each other's arrival time. This happens since the network comes with some capacity constraints and thus congestion may occur. The described situation corresponds to the situation in a traffic scenario. While mathematical models for traffic scenarios are simplified but well-studied, there are simulation tools providing detailed models where equilibria are computable, but which are theoretically poorly understood. The goal of this thesis is to contribute to the development of mathematical competitive flow over time models towards more det...
Nash flows over time describe the behavior of selfish users eager to reach their destination as earl...
Dynamic network flows, or network flows over time, constitute an important model for real-world situ...
According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly,...
We study Nash equilibria in the context of flows over time. Many results on static routing games hav...
Abstract. We study Nash equilibria in the context of flows over time. Many results on static routing...
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the context of flows over time. Many results on...
Traffic congestion imposes a huge economic loss to the economy. As such, there has been a huge effor...
Oligopolistic competitive packet routing games model situations in which traffic is routed in discre...
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source...
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source...
In an atomic splittable flow over time game, finitely many players route flow dynamically through a ...
We consider a dynamic model of traffic that has received a lot of attention in the past few years. U...
AbstractCongestion games are a fundamental and widely studied model for selfish allocation problems ...
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source...
Routing games are studied to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficie...
Nash flows over time describe the behavior of selfish users eager to reach their destination as earl...
Dynamic network flows, or network flows over time, constitute an important model for real-world situ...
According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly,...
We study Nash equilibria in the context of flows over time. Many results on static routing games hav...
Abstract. We study Nash equilibria in the context of flows over time. Many results on static routing...
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the context of flows over time. Many results on...
Traffic congestion imposes a huge economic loss to the economy. As such, there has been a huge effor...
Oligopolistic competitive packet routing games model situations in which traffic is routed in discre...
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source...
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source...
In an atomic splittable flow over time game, finitely many players route flow dynamically through a ...
We consider a dynamic model of traffic that has received a lot of attention in the past few years. U...
AbstractCongestion games are a fundamental and widely studied model for selfish allocation problems ...
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source...
Routing games are studied to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficie...
Nash flows over time describe the behavior of selfish users eager to reach their destination as earl...
Dynamic network flows, or network flows over time, constitute an important model for real-world situ...
According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly,...