Add to ORKGWhen can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind the refutability of matching theory. A preference profile rationalizes a collection of matchings if the matchings are stable under the profile. Matching theory is refutable if there are observations of matchings that cannot be rationalized. I show that the theory is refutable, and provide a characterization of the matchings that can be rationalized
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characteriz...
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characteriz...
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish f...
In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stabil...
In this paper we show that a one-to-one two-sided matching market possesses a unique stable matching...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
We investigate the testable implications of the theory that markets produce matchings that are optim...
We investigate the testable implications of the theory that markets produce matchings that are optim...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals where an institution can...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characteriz...
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characteriz...
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish f...
In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stabil...
In this paper we show that a one-to-one two-sided matching market possesses a unique stable matching...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
We investigate the testable implications of the theory that markets produce matchings that are optim...
We investigate the testable implications of the theory that markets produce matchings that are optim...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals where an institution can...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...