Add to ORKGIn this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.One-to-one matching Stability Externalities Rationalizability
We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We p...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stabil...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable...
We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable...
© 2016. Certain aggregate externalities, like those due to knowledge and public goods, do not change...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish f...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We p...
We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We p...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stabil...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable...
We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable...
© 2016. Certain aggregate externalities, like those due to knowledge and public goods, do not change...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish f...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We p...
We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We p...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...