We construct a theory to compare vertically integrated firms to networks of manufacturers and suppliers. Vertically integrated firms make their own specialized inputs. In networks, manufacturers procure specialized inputs from suppliers that, in turn, sell to several manufacturers. The analysis shows that networks can yield greater social welfare when manufacturers experience large idiosyncratic demand shocks. Individual firms may also have the incentive to form networks, despite the lack of long-term contracts. The analysis is supported by existing evidence and provides predictions as to the shape of different industries
We analyze the welfare consequences and the profitability of vertical integration when downstream fi...
We analyze the welfare consequences and the profitability of vertical integration when downstream fi...
We analyze the welfare consequences and the profitability of vertical integration when downstream fi...
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
Improving a company's bargaining position is often cited as a chief motivation to vertically integra...
Improving a company's bargaining position is often cited as a chief motivation to vertically integra...
Improving a company’s bargaining position is often cited as a chief mo-tivation to vertically integr...
Improving a company's bargaining position is often cited as a chief motivation to vertically integra...
Improving a company's bargaining position is often cited as a chief motivation to vertically integra...
This paper provides a simple model of bargaining and integration within a network and considers how ...
Salinger (1988, QJE) derives the relationship between the number of vertically-integrated firms and ...
This paper presents a survey of recent research on the formation of networks between firms. The pape...
This paper presents a survey of recent research on the formation of networks between firms. The pape...
This paper models the decision of vertically linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
We analyze the welfare consequences and the profitability of vertical integration when downstream fi...
We analyze the welfare consequences and the profitability of vertical integration when downstream fi...
We analyze the welfare consequences and the profitability of vertical integration when downstream fi...
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
Improving a company's bargaining position is often cited as a chief motivation to vertically integra...
Improving a company's bargaining position is often cited as a chief motivation to vertically integra...
Improving a company’s bargaining position is often cited as a chief mo-tivation to vertically integr...
Improving a company's bargaining position is often cited as a chief motivation to vertically integra...
Improving a company's bargaining position is often cited as a chief motivation to vertically integra...
This paper provides a simple model of bargaining and integration within a network and considers how ...
Salinger (1988, QJE) derives the relationship between the number of vertically-integrated firms and ...
This paper presents a survey of recent research on the formation of networks between firms. The pape...
This paper presents a survey of recent research on the formation of networks between firms. The pape...
This paper models the decision of vertically linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
We analyze the welfare consequences and the profitability of vertical integration when downstream fi...
We analyze the welfare consequences and the profitability of vertical integration when downstream fi...
We analyze the welfare consequences and the profitability of vertical integration when downstream fi...