This paper models the decision of vertically linked firms to build either partitioned or connected networks of supply of an intermediate good. In each case, there is a correlation between the locations of upstream and downstream firms. Input specificity is related to both variable costs (transport costs of the input) and fixed costs (learning costs of the use of the input). When both are low, a connected network emerges, whereas, in the opposite case, we find a partitioned pattern. In the boundary region, there are multiple equilibria, either asymmetric (mixed network) or symmetricinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms ...
AbstractMost regional literature focuses on competition among final goods, but little of it integrat...
This paper considers the locational choice of firms in an upstream and a downstream industry. Both i...
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its re...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper deals with the location of input supply in a two country spatial economy. A duopoly suppl...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper models the location of two vertically related firms in a low labor cost country and in a ...
This paper assesses the impact of the production and use of an intermediate good upon the location o...
This paper considers the locational choice of firms in an upstream and a downstream industry. Both i...
We construct a theory to compare vertically integrated firms to networks of manufacturers and suppli...
In this paper competition between two network firms is analysed under two alternative regulatory reg...
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms ...
AbstractMost regional literature focuses on competition among final goods, but little of it integrat...
This paper considers the locational choice of firms in an upstream and a downstream industry. Both i...
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its re...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper deals with the location of input supply in a two country spatial economy. A duopoly suppl...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper models the location of two vertically related firms in a low labor cost country and in a ...
This paper assesses the impact of the production and use of an intermediate good upon the location o...
This paper considers the locational choice of firms in an upstream and a downstream industry. Both i...
We construct a theory to compare vertically integrated firms to networks of manufacturers and suppli...
In this paper competition between two network firms is analysed under two alternative regulatory reg...
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms ...
AbstractMost regional literature focuses on competition among final goods, but little of it integrat...
This paper considers the locational choice of firms in an upstream and a downstream industry. Both i...