Add to ORKGIn this paper I explore an epistemic asymmetry that sometimes occurs regarding the moral status of alternative actions. I argue that this asymmetry is significant and has ramifications for what it is morally permissible to do. I then show how this asymmetry often obtains regarding three moral issues: vegetarianism, abortion, and charitable giving. In doing so, I rely on the epistemic significance of disagreement and the existence of moral controversy about these issues
Moral epistemology, like general epistemology, faces a regress problem. Suppose someone demands to k...
A popular argument is that peer disagreement about controversial moral topics undermines justified m...
Moral disagreement — roughly, disagreement about what is right or wrong — is widely considered to be...
In this paper I explore an epistemic asymmetry that sometimes occurs regarding the moral status of a...
This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epist...
What is moral epistemology? It is the attempt to construct a theory that explains whether and how mo...
This paper suggests that moral epistemologists have been focusing on the wrong questions, or at leas...
Moral reasoning is as fallible as reasoning in any other cognitive domain, but we often behave as if...
We frequently find ourselves in intractable disagreements about the morality of abortion euthanasia,...
This paper concerns the epistemology of difficult moral cases where the difficulty is not traceable ...
In this paper, I propose a solution to a challenge formulated by Judith Jarvis Thomson: We have to e...
This article is about the implications of a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagre...
David Enoch, in Taking Morality Seriously, argues for a broad normative asymmetry between how we sho...
Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we ...
When people disagree about what is moral, we face an epistemological challenge—when the answer to a ...
Moral epistemology, like general epistemology, faces a regress problem. Suppose someone demands to k...
A popular argument is that peer disagreement about controversial moral topics undermines justified m...
Moral disagreement — roughly, disagreement about what is right or wrong — is widely considered to be...
In this paper I explore an epistemic asymmetry that sometimes occurs regarding the moral status of a...
This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epist...
What is moral epistemology? It is the attempt to construct a theory that explains whether and how mo...
This paper suggests that moral epistemologists have been focusing on the wrong questions, or at leas...
Moral reasoning is as fallible as reasoning in any other cognitive domain, but we often behave as if...
We frequently find ourselves in intractable disagreements about the morality of abortion euthanasia,...
This paper concerns the epistemology of difficult moral cases where the difficulty is not traceable ...
In this paper, I propose a solution to a challenge formulated by Judith Jarvis Thomson: We have to e...
This article is about the implications of a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagre...
David Enoch, in Taking Morality Seriously, argues for a broad normative asymmetry between how we sho...
Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we ...
When people disagree about what is moral, we face an epistemological challenge—when the answer to a ...
Moral epistemology, like general epistemology, faces a regress problem. Suppose someone demands to k...
A popular argument is that peer disagreement about controversial moral topics undermines justified m...
Moral disagreement — roughly, disagreement about what is right or wrong — is widely considered to be...