This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolistically competitive (MC) sector in which firms may have heterogeneous productivity levels. Analysis encompasses cases in which the domestic MC sector is able to expand or contract flexibly, or is constrained to be of fixed size. In the former case domestic protection can bring gains by increasing the number of product varieties on offer; these gains (and the corresponding rates of domestic subsidy or of import tariffs) are reduced by heterogeneity of foreign exporters some of whom may withdraw from the market. In the latter case gains from protection arise from terms-of-trade effects; since various margins of substitution are switched off, onl...
This paper presents a two-country monopolistic competition trade model to analyze how the profit ta...
A standard critique of the strategic, two-stage industrial and trade policy models is that trade pol...
This paper shows that an importing country can have an incentive to impose a tariff to extract rents...
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolist...
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolis...
The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals ...
We consider unilateral and strategic trade and domestic policies in single and multi-sector versions...
The majority of research to date investigating optimal tariffs in the presence of multinationals fin...
This paper builds a Ricardian-Chamberlinian two-country model with heterogeneous firms in a monopoli...
In this paper we examine optimal strategic trade policy under oligopoly with many home and foreign f...
[[abstract]]In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if ...
[[abstract]]This paper develops a generalized three‐country model with downstream and upstream indus...
The paper examines optimal strategic trade policy under a heterogeneous cost oligopoly. The first-be...
This paper models the international competition between a domestic firm and its vertically integrate...
We study optimal trade policy in a Krugman type model of trade. We conduct a general analysis allowi...
This paper presents a two-country monopolistic competition trade model to analyze how the profit ta...
A standard critique of the strategic, two-stage industrial and trade policy models is that trade pol...
This paper shows that an importing country can have an incentive to impose a tariff to extract rents...
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolist...
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolis...
The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals ...
We consider unilateral and strategic trade and domestic policies in single and multi-sector versions...
The majority of research to date investigating optimal tariffs in the presence of multinationals fin...
This paper builds a Ricardian-Chamberlinian two-country model with heterogeneous firms in a monopoli...
In this paper we examine optimal strategic trade policy under oligopoly with many home and foreign f...
[[abstract]]In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if ...
[[abstract]]This paper develops a generalized three‐country model with downstream and upstream indus...
The paper examines optimal strategic trade policy under a heterogeneous cost oligopoly. The first-be...
This paper models the international competition between a domestic firm and its vertically integrate...
We study optimal trade policy in a Krugman type model of trade. We conduct a general analysis allowi...
This paper presents a two-country monopolistic competition trade model to analyze how the profit ta...
A standard critique of the strategic, two-stage industrial and trade policy models is that trade pol...
This paper shows that an importing country can have an incentive to impose a tariff to extract rents...