[[abstract]]This paper develops a generalized three‐country model with downstream and upstream industries to analyze optimal import and export trade policies in the presence of monopoly distortion in a foreign intermediate input market. It shows that the import tariff and export tax are linearly dependent. Thus, the optimal choice of the tariff gives rise to the same results as the optimal choice of the export tax, which implies that the domestic government, to avoid tariff retaliation, can use export tax as a substitute for the import tariff.[[journaltype]]國外[[incitationindex]]SSC
This paper uses a numerical general equilibrium model to examine the quantitative importance of pre-...
[[abstract]]This paper examines the optimal trade policies when internationalsubcontracting occurs b...
[[abstract]]In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if ...
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit shifting argument for export subsidies. Trade...
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit-shifting argument for export subsidies. At th...
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit-shifting argument for export subsidies. At th...
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit-shifting argument for export subsidies. At th...
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolist...
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolist...
AbstractThis paper constructs a two-country, three-firm trade model with a two-stage game to explore...
When a country possesses a monopoly power in the international markets in which it trades, a competi...
When a country possesses a monopoly power in the international markets in which it trades, a competi...
[[abstract]]This paper examines the optimal export policies when ex ante negotiation over subcontrac...
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolis...
THIS paper examines the role of import tariffs and consumption taxes when an importable product is s...
This paper uses a numerical general equilibrium model to examine the quantitative importance of pre-...
[[abstract]]This paper examines the optimal trade policies when internationalsubcontracting occurs b...
[[abstract]]In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if ...
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit shifting argument for export subsidies. Trade...
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit-shifting argument for export subsidies. At th...
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit-shifting argument for export subsidies. At th...
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit-shifting argument for export subsidies. At th...
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolist...
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolist...
AbstractThis paper constructs a two-country, three-firm trade model with a two-stage game to explore...
When a country possesses a monopoly power in the international markets in which it trades, a competi...
When a country possesses a monopoly power in the international markets in which it trades, a competi...
[[abstract]]This paper examines the optimal export policies when ex ante negotiation over subcontrac...
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolis...
THIS paper examines the role of import tariffs and consumption taxes when an importable product is s...
This paper uses a numerical general equilibrium model to examine the quantitative importance of pre-...
[[abstract]]This paper examines the optimal trade policies when internationalsubcontracting occurs b...
[[abstract]]In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if ...