Borrowers can raise funds from a competitive banking sector that shares information and from opaque hidden lenders. Hidden lenders allow borrowers to conceal poor results, and thereby affect contracts in the banking sector. In equilibrium, borrowers obtain funds from both sectors simultaneously. The lack of transparency generates cross-subsidies between different borrowers who are observationally equivalent to banks and face the same interest rate. As the cost of hidden borrowing falls, an increasing number of borrowers face identical terms; for sufficiently low costs, all borrowers who take loans (which may include inefficient borrowers) use the same bank debt contract
Banks appear to be uniquely able to make loans and sell CDs to fund those loans. Since bank CDs carr...
In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit r...
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protec...
Borrowers can raise funds from a competitive banking sector that shares information and from opaque ...
Borrowers can raise funds from a competitive banking sector that shares information and from opaque ...
We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive banking sector that sha...
We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive banking sector that sha...
We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive baking sector, that sha...
Large money center and regional banks actively target and market interest rate swaps to middle mark...
Can a bank increase its profit by subsidizing inactivity? This paper suggests this may occur, due to...
Firms choose debt structure and competing banks choose monitoring intensity. Monitoring improves cre...
Firms choose debt structure and competing banks choose monitoring intensity. Monitoring improves cr...
This study examines the effect of banks’ competitor-specific knowledge, whether a bank has lent mone...
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protec...
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protec...
Banks appear to be uniquely able to make loans and sell CDs to fund those loans. Since bank CDs carr...
In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit r...
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protec...
Borrowers can raise funds from a competitive banking sector that shares information and from opaque ...
Borrowers can raise funds from a competitive banking sector that shares information and from opaque ...
We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive banking sector that sha...
We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive banking sector that sha...
We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive baking sector, that sha...
Large money center and regional banks actively target and market interest rate swaps to middle mark...
Can a bank increase its profit by subsidizing inactivity? This paper suggests this may occur, due to...
Firms choose debt structure and competing banks choose monitoring intensity. Monitoring improves cre...
Firms choose debt structure and competing banks choose monitoring intensity. Monitoring improves cr...
This study examines the effect of banks’ competitor-specific knowledge, whether a bank has lent mone...
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protec...
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protec...
Banks appear to be uniquely able to make loans and sell CDs to fund those loans. Since bank CDs carr...
In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit r...
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protec...