Are contributions involuntary public good experiments inflated because subjects are given money for their initial endowments? There is evidence that people receiving small, one time "windfall gains" have a high marginal propensity to consume them, and when doing so, exhibit greater riskseeking behaviour. Similar effects may be present in voluntary contribution experiments, causing subjects to contribute more to public goods than they would if using their own money. The effect ofwindfall money is tested by comparing VCM contribution rates when subjects supply their own endowments with those when endowments are provided, while holding constant the distribution of total promised earnings
Evidence from an experiment investigating the “house money effect” in the context of a public goods ...
AbstractThis paper investigates whether risk preferences inform the decision of how much to put into...
The public goods game examines how people make decisions about contributing money for group benefit....
Numerous papers have documented that subjects in VCM and dictator games behave differently (usually ...
Experiments in economics usually begin with an initial endowment to subjects. Essentially, subjects ...
In the vast majority of laboratory experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are...
In the vast majority of experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are endowed w...
This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members h...
This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members h...
The house-money effect, understood as people's tendency to be more daring with easily-gotten money, ...
We reconsider evidence from experiments that claim to show that using house money in standard publ...
Several papers have documented that when subjects play with standard laboratory “endowments” they ma...
International audienceWe experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where in...
Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell participants only oftheir group's total cont...
A growing number of experimental studies focus on the differences between the lab and the field. Imp...
Evidence from an experiment investigating the “house money effect” in the context of a public goods ...
AbstractThis paper investigates whether risk preferences inform the decision of how much to put into...
The public goods game examines how people make decisions about contributing money for group benefit....
Numerous papers have documented that subjects in VCM and dictator games behave differently (usually ...
Experiments in economics usually begin with an initial endowment to subjects. Essentially, subjects ...
In the vast majority of laboratory experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are...
In the vast majority of experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are endowed w...
This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members h...
This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members h...
The house-money effect, understood as people's tendency to be more daring with easily-gotten money, ...
We reconsider evidence from experiments that claim to show that using house money in standard publ...
Several papers have documented that when subjects play with standard laboratory “endowments” they ma...
International audienceWe experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where in...
Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell participants only oftheir group's total cont...
A growing number of experimental studies focus on the differences between the lab and the field. Imp...
Evidence from an experiment investigating the “house money effect” in the context of a public goods ...
AbstractThis paper investigates whether risk preferences inform the decision of how much to put into...
The public goods game examines how people make decisions about contributing money for group benefit....