Add to ORKGWe show that any transferable utility game can be represented by an assignment of facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost of the facilities. The intuitive solution in the representation turns out to be the Shapley value of the game, and thus serves as an alternative justification of the value
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58464-4_1....
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
A transferable utility game deals with problems of how to allocate the total benefit among players b...
We show that any transferable utility game can be represented by an assignment of facilities to play...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division scheme in cooperative game theory,...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first...
In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J ...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative game theory...
We introduce a non linear weighted Shapley value for cooperative games with transferable utility, in...
Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley values as a family of values, also known as Shapley ...
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. It turns...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58464-4_1....
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
A transferable utility game deals with problems of how to allocate the total benefit among players b...
We show that any transferable utility game can be represented by an assignment of facilities to play...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division scheme in cooperative game theory,...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first...
In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J ...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative game theory...
We introduce a non linear weighted Shapley value for cooperative games with transferable utility, in...
Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley values as a family of values, also known as Shapley ...
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. It turns...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58464-4_1....
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
A transferable utility game deals with problems of how to allocate the total benefit among players b...