This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members’ effort and ability. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates’ performances in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market’s assessments, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work effort is above and help effort is below their efficient levels
Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Un...
We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able co-workers when ...
Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Un...
This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow te...
We study how the mechanism used for assigning roles within teams affects team performance. Subjects ...
Team production analysis are usually carried in static frameworks where employees choose neither the...
This paper develops a model of career concerns. The worker’s skill is revealed through output, wage ...
This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probabil...
This dissertation analyzes the incentives of workers in organizations that utilize teams. In Chapter...
We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able co-workers when ...
Team incentives are important in many compensation systems that pay workers according to the output ...
In a laboratory experiment, I investigate the role of perceived own ability in a multi-task setting ...
This thesis explores how career concerns and information affect organizational performance. Its firs...
This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probabili...
I examine how career concerns are shaped by the nature of productive actions taken by workers. A wor...
Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Un...
We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able co-workers when ...
Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Un...
This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow te...
We study how the mechanism used for assigning roles within teams affects team performance. Subjects ...
Team production analysis are usually carried in static frameworks where employees choose neither the...
This paper develops a model of career concerns. The worker’s skill is revealed through output, wage ...
This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probabil...
This dissertation analyzes the incentives of workers in organizations that utilize teams. In Chapter...
We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able co-workers when ...
Team incentives are important in many compensation systems that pay workers according to the output ...
In a laboratory experiment, I investigate the role of perceived own ability in a multi-task setting ...
This thesis explores how career concerns and information affect organizational performance. Its firs...
This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probabili...
I examine how career concerns are shaped by the nature of productive actions taken by workers. A wor...
Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Un...
We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able co-workers when ...
Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Un...